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Unrealized Gain. and Loss and Dividend Law
The striking features of the legal field described in the title above are
the confusion of statutes relating to it,' the paucity of cases on point,2 and
the existence, nevertheless, of a few fixed rules which are said to govern
decisions. These rules are: (i) Unrealized losses and gains in fixed assets
are disregarded in computing the fund available for cash dividends.3  In
other words, the assets will be carried at cost less depreciation,4 regardless
of changes in market value. Unrealized gain may be the basis for share
dividends.- Possibly unrealized loss may be the basis for a reduction of
capital stock, 6 but such a reduction is never discussed as either a possible
or necessary corollary to the share dividend. (2) Unrealized losses in cur-
rent assets must be taken into account before payment of any dividend.7
Unrealized gains are disregarded for all purposes. The accounting phrase
is, "current assets must be carried at cost or market whichever is lower."
Statutes define the fund available for dividends as the surplus of assets
over liabilities including capital stock," profits of the business,9 or one of
several combinations of the two.10 Yet courts and commentators, with rare
exceptions,"1 apply the rules outlined above to cases arising under every
type of statute. 2  More than enthusiasm for a rule of thumb lies behind
such indiscriminate lawmaking. The confusion of the statutes, which often
combine both tests in a single clause, suggests that there is no clear legisla-
tive intent behind any particular form of words. 3 Furthermore, there are
so few relevant cases throughout the country that the court must either
brave the "case of first impression," or disregard statutory distinctions to
invoke the comforting analogies of holdings in other states.
This dearth of authority is both difficult to understand and unfor-
tunate. The amount of wealth distributed each year as dividends indicates
the desirability of a developed technique for their regulation.' 4 In addi-
tion, in the modern corporation management frequently owns common
I. See section 5, page 344 imfra.
2. See Randall v. Bailey, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 173, 178 (Sup. Ct. 194o) ; DODD AND
BAKER, CASES ON BusiNEss AssocIATIoNs (I940), Note on Unrealized Diminution
in Value of Fixed Assets; Intangibles, 1105, iio8. This phase of the problem is dis-
cussed in sections I and 2, pp. 339 and 340 infra.
3. II FLETCHER, CO1PORATIoNs (rev. ed. 1932) § 5345.
4. For a discussion of this method of accounting see section 3, page 341 infra.
5. DODD AND BAKER, op. cit. supra note 2, Note on Unrealized Appreciation of
Assets, 1118, i1ig. This is by implication allowed in Pennsylvania by statute, 15 PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) §2852-701 (A).
6. Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1025, iO26.
7. GRAHAM AND KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTIcE (1932) 184.
8. E. g., OHIO CODE ANN. (Baldwin 194o) § 8623-38. See general discussion
of statutes, section 5, P. 344 infra.
g. CAL. CI. CODE (Deering 1937) § 346.
IO. DEL. REv. CODE (1935) c. 65, § 34.
ii. Weiner and Bonbright, Anglo-American Dividend Law: Surplus and Profit
(1930) 30 COL. L. Rv. 954, 977.
12. Peters v. U. S. Mortgage Company, 13 Del. Ch. ii, i8, 114 Atl. 598, 6o2
(Ch. 1921), discussed in KEHL, CoRPoRATE DIVIDENDs (1941) 6o; Note (1936) 35
MICH. L. REV. 286, 288.
13. (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 822. This is a discussion of Randall v. Bailey,
23 N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (Sup. Ct. [94o), in which the court made a valiant effort to
ascertain legislative intent from the changes in wording from one statute to the next.
14. 2 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORI'ORATIONS (4th ed. 1941) 774.
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shares.15  The temptation to pay unjustified dividends is obvious. The
theoretical control in the votes of other shareholders has actually passed to
the same management group.'6 The only curb left for a minority share-
holder is his power to enjoin or rescind an improper declaration of
dividends.1
7
The contrast between the importance of the subject and the meagre
and unsatisfactory authority thereon invites investigation. But research
does not lead to a logically symmetrical analysis. It can do no more than
isolate a few of the factors which have affected the decided cases and pro-
posed theories. An attempt to impose on these factors a fixed order of
importance would fail because of the heterogeneous elements of law, eco-
nomics, and accounting involved in every case. Therefore, this note will
merely discuss the problems and attempt to show the roots of each.
i. The Nature of the Legal Remedy
The paucity of cases may be explained partly by the procedural diffi-
culties facing the plaintiff.' In the first place, of course, he can seldom
force payment of a dividend against the directors' discretion; he is nor-
mally confined to an attack on a dividend paid or planned. The number
of possible combinations of litigants is large. Plaintiffs may include the
corporation,19 a shareholder suing for it,20 a creditor,2' a trustee in bank-
ruptcy suing in either capacity, 22 a receiver, or even the state suing in quo
warranto.23 Recovery may be sought from either shareholders 24 or direc-
tors.2 5 Where directors are defendants, the action may be for an injunc-
tion or for damages. In every case there is one or more procedural diffi-
culties involved.
Dissolution or insolvency is a condition precedent to a creditor's right
to recover.26 Furthermore, he must decide whether to sue separately or for
the benefit of others.
A shareholder suing for the corporation must join both the corpora-
tion and the directors. Again procedural difficulties may arise.
2 7
A trustee in bankruptcy must choose whether to sue as corporation or
creditor under applicable state statutes, and if forced to the latter, often
faces the theory that creditors' rights are personal, or must be exercised as
a group.
28
15. Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 492, 494, n. 7.
16. BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CoRaoRATio AND PRIVATE PRoPERTY
(1932) 9o-II8.
17. This theory is developed at length in Note (1940) 49 YA.LE L. J. 492.
18. Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 492, 498, n. 22. A full discussion of the material
included in this section appears in KEEL, op. cit. supra note 12, cc. 7 and 8.
ig. E. g., Southern California Home Builders v. Young, 45 Cal. App. 679, 188
Pac. 586 (1920).
2o. E. g., Kahle v. Mount Vernon Trust Co., 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 454 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
21. E. g., Appleton v. American Malting Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 375, 54 At. 454 (1903).
22. The trustee succeeds to all causes of action which the bankrupt corporation
could have exercised under § 7oa(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, ii U. S. C. A. § Iioa(5)
(Supp. 1940). He can set aside a transfer which was voidable as to any creditors
under § 7oe, II U. S. C. A. § Iloe (Supp. 194o).
23. State v. Bray, 323 Mo. 562, 20 S. W. (2d) 56 (1929).
24. KEHL, op. cit. supra, note 12, c. 8.
25. Id. c. 7.
26. Id. at 260.
27. Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 492, 498, n. 22.
28. KEHL, op. cit. .Stpra note 12, 260-262.
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An action against shareholders faces their immunity from suit unless
they received the dividend with knowledge of its illegality.29 There is also
the problem of whether the plaintiff can invoke equity jurisdiction for a
class suit or must sue each defendant separately at law. 0 Modem statutes
may postpone shareholders' liability until it has been determined that
directors are either not liable or judgment-proof. 31
Directors, when sued, can evoke the defense of good faith or due care 8 2
and even an added presumption that they acted in good faith.3" This makes
the plaintiff prove not only that the dividend was in fact unjustified, but
that the directors' state of mind in declaring it was reprehensible, a stag-
gering burden. Also in suits against directors an injunction is theoreti-
cally possible,3 4 though practically it is difficult for an outsider to unearth
from the accounts even enough evidence to justify a suit or to support a
preliminary injunction before the dividend becomes an accomplished fact.3 5
Therefore, as a practical matter the suit will usually be for recovery rather
than injunction. Yet it seems possible that the court will tend to view the
action for recovery as tardy and to penalize the plaintiff for not having
acted sooner to prevent the wrong.36
2. Difficulties of Proof
A plaintiff who challenges a dividend faces, in addition to the intrica-
cies of legal remedy, obstacles inherent in the nature of the material with
which he deals. The first is the reverence of the court for standard account-
ing methods.3 7 Accountants agree that fixed assets should be carried at
cost less a charge for depreciation 88 which is designed merely to spread
that cost over the expected life of the asset and does not pretend to reflect
fluctuations in market value or purchasing power.3 9 This system does not
show what the plaintiff would call "the true worth" of the asset. To estab-
lish that true worth, the plaintiff will have to adopt another accounting
method,40 and will have to convince the court of its superiority. This is a
large task, since the court is rarely sufficiently versed in accounting to form
its own opinion, and if it turns to accountants for advice, it is met with
virtually unanimous endorsement of the system which the plaintiff attacks. 4
If the plaintiff chooses a more direct way of exposing the change in
value which he must allege as the foundation of his case, he meets other
obstacles. He offers testimony that the same assets were carried at a
29. McDonald v. Williams, 174 U. S. 397 (1899).
3o. Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56 (19o3).
31. UNIFORm BUSINESS CORPOUATIO N Ace § 25, 9 U. L. A. 77.
32. DODD AND BAKE, op. cit. supra note 2, Note on Good Faith and Due Care as
'Defenses, 1164.
33. Notes (1928) 55 A. L. R. 8, 145 (cited in Gallagher v. N. Y. Dock Co., i9
N. Y. S. (2d) 789, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
34. Only two cases have been found in which plaintiff sought an injunction for
this reason, Washburn v. National Wallpaper Co., 81 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897);
Hyams v. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 507, 89 Atl.
37 (Ch. 1913).
35. See Gallagher v. N. Y. Dock Co., i N. Y. S. (2d) 789, 8ol (Sup. Ct. 1940).
The court mentions that plaintiff spent 14 years examining the corporate books.
36. See (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 822, 823.
37. See Gallagher v. N. Y. Dock Co., ig N. Y. S. (2d) 789, 8o6 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
38. GRAHAM AND KATZ, op. cit. supra note 7, 184; Note (1936) 35 Micn. L.
REv. 286, 288.
39. Weiner and Bonbright, Theory of Anglo-Avwrican Dividend Law: Surplus
and Profits (1930) 30 COL. L. Ray. 330, 344, 351.
4o. See discussion in section 3, P. 341 infra.
41. See note 38 supra.
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different value in making out the corporation's tax returns 42 or in a peti-
tion for reorganization. 43  The court rejects the testimony on the grounds
that values may be different for different purposes, or, more realistically,
that it is natural for directors to mark assets down in dealing with tax
authorities and up in preparing a balance sheet to support a dividend.
44
Where the assets are securities, the plaintiff may rely on market value.
He is met with the doctrine that market value represents only "quick"
value as opposed to a real, "intrinsic" value, which may be quite different. 5
Expert testimony is as unreliable here as in most cases.4 6 In addi-
tion, the plaintiff may have to evaluate good will, at best a slippery subject
and one which one court has frankly declined to struggle with.
4 7
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the effect of these obstacles is the
cases in which the plaintiff won. In the only case arising on the plead-
ings, 48 plaintiff was relieved of the burden of proof and won. In other
cases the corporate books had been discredited by collateral evidence of
fraud,49 or of a disregard of the values shown thereon by the directors
themselves.5 The court was therefore free to find value independently.
All other cases involved changes in value so large that the facts themselves
carried the burden of proof. In Branch v. Kaiser'51 there was a decline of
$i,ooo,ooo in the value of assets of a corporation whose capital stock was
$i,ooo,ooo and whose purported surplus was only $171,ooo. No case
involved a change in value of less than IOO per cent.52 Under his present
handicaps b. plaintiff cannot hope to succeed except in such flagrant cases.
3. Value and Accounting
The previous section has demonstrated the difficulty of proving value
in the face of corporation accounts. It has therefore been suggested that if
a method of accounting were followed which more nearly reflected value,
the plaintiff would better be able to establish the first premise of his argu-
ment: namely, that a change in value has occurred.53 The present account-
ing system is vulnerable on two points. First, it assumes that cost repre-
sents value at the time of purchase.54 This in turn assumes an arm's-
length sale. But in actual fact many sales are made in return for shares
in the corporation. Since this identifies the seller's interest as a corporate
42. Gallagher v. N. Y. Dock Co., ig N. Y. S. (2d) 789, 807 (Sup. Ct. 194o). But
a tax assessment has been accepted as evidence of real value, Randall v. Bailey, 23
N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
43. Kahle v. Mount Vernon Trust Co., 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 454 (Sup. Ct. I940).
44. Notes 42 and 43 supra.
45. Kahle v. Mount Vernon Trust Co., 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 454, 458 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
citing Irving Trust Co. v. Gunder, 152 Misc. 83, 271 N. Y. S. 795 (Sup. Ct 1934).
46. Compare Kahle v. Mount Vernon Trust Co., 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 454 (Sup. Ct.
1940), where such evidence was belittled, with Whittaker v. Amwell Nat'l Bk. 52 N.
J. Eq. 400, 29 At. 203 (Ch. 1894), where the court relied heavily on the opinion
of experts.
47. Washburn v. National Wallpaper Co., 8i Fed. 17, 21 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897).
48. Seigman v. Elec. Vehicle Co., 140 Fed. 117 (C. C. D. N. J. 1905).
49. Whittaker v. Amwell National Bank, 52 N. J. Eq. 400, 29 Atl. 203 (Ch. 1894).
5o. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Grand Rapids Ry., 7 F. Supp. 51r (W. D. Mich. 193).
51. 291 Pa. 543, 14o AtI. 498 (1928).
52. To the cases cited in notes 49, 5o, and 5! snpra, add Southern California
Home Builders v. Young, 45 Cal. App. 75I, 188 Pac. 586 (1920). Cf. Randall v.
Bailey, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940), where an 8oo percent increase in value
was held available for dividends.
53. Note (1936) 35 Micn. L. REV. 286.
54. Note (1940) 49 YAL L. J. 492, 500.
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shareholder with the buyer's interest as corporation, the essential conflict
of interests relied on in the assumption that cost gives value disappears. 5
Secondly, it is assumed that ordinary straight-line depreciation pre-
sents the change in value from day to day.5" Obviously depreciation does
not reflect a major change in market value or a sudden technical obsoles-
cence. It is not meant to.57 The essence of the disparity between account-
ing value and "real" value is just that the present method of accounting is
designed to show cash profit and loss on quick transactions. 58 To do so,
the accountant should and does preserve original cost. The trouble is that
courts have used these same accounts in applying the balance-sheet surplus
test to determine the dividend fund. The court apparently will not recog-
nize its error. The accountant is equally adamant in refusing to reflect
unrealized changes in his profit and loss statement. The result is confusion.
A change in value may mean either a change in the general price level,
i. e., a change in the value of money, or a change in the value of the prop-
erty in question in relation to other property.59 Only the latter produces
the situation here discussed, but any proposed accounting method should
reflect both. Cost accounting, because it is based on original price in dol-
lars, does not compensate for changes in price level. 60 For instance, if
prices decline, a depreciation charge based on original cost will be too large.
It will produce a reserve larger than necessary for replacement and will
thus divert to that reserve profits which would have been available for
dividends.
Two other standards of value are in use for special purposes and have
been suggested here. One is the criterion of reproduction cost.61 If assets
were valued at the probable cost of replacement, changes in price level
would be reflected. These might then be compensated on the liability side
by suitable reserves, thus changing the number of dollars of capital stock
to conform with changes in the price level.62 But this method of valuation
still compares property with money, and so does not show changes in rela-
tive property value. For instance, a plant made of obsolete material might
have a reproduction value of $I,ooo,ooo. Yet if an equivalent plant could
be built for $500,000, this plant will be worth no more than $5oo,ooo on the
open market, or to the corporation as a going concern.
65
Another suggested standard is that of capitalized expected earnings,
which is said to give "going concern" value. 64 The rate of capitalization is
one which will attract investors. This means that on sale the plant will
bring its capitalized value. Here it seems the comparison with other prop-
erty devoted to the same purpose is embodied in the rate of capitalization.
The comparison between property and money is embodied in the estimate
55. (94) 50 YALE L. J. 306, 312.
56. Probably no accountant would make such a claim, but the assumption is in-
herent in many discussions of the subject. Compare KEHL, op. Cit. sipra, n. 12, text p.
92 with cases there cited in n. 25.
57. Note 39 spra.
58. Weiner and Bonbright, note 39 supra, 335.
59. Note (1936) 35 MIcH. L. REv. 286.
6o. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. This procedure in various forms has been called an "accounting" or "quasi-"
reorganization. See discussion in section 6, page 345 infra and generally Katz, Ac-
counting Problems in Corporate Dirtributions (941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 764, 769;
Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 492.
63. For an extreme case of similar obsolescence see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Grand
Rapids Ry., 7 F. Supp. 511 (W. D. Mich. 193).
64. I DEwiNG, op. cit. supra, note 14, 296-315; Note (ig4o) 49 YALE L. 3. 492,
501.
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of future earnings, which should follow prices up or down. Theoretically
and in practice this is the best system. There still remains, of course, the
problem of adjusting the capital stock to changing price levels. 5 When
this has been done, the problem of this note emerges stripped of non-
essentials. A criticism against either of these methods of accounting is
that they may require a separate accounting for dividend purposes, for it is
not likely that the corporation will use such accounting for other purposes.
Valuing current assets is much less difficult. They are rarely held
long enough to be affected by major fluctuations in price or value. Gen-
erally they are carried on the books at the lower of cost or market, 66 that
is, unrealized losses are shown, unrealized gains are not.6 7  The incon-
sistency is apparent. It has been explained as arising from the regulations
for income tax returns which allow this method of accounting.68 Quite
possibly the custom preceded and suggested the regulation. Inconsistent
though it may be, it has been defended as a "principle of conservatism"
which is necessary to offset the natural optimism of the business man.
69
4. Nature of Property Involved
Where the choice between two rules of law and accounting is gov-
erned by whether the particular asset is denominated "fixed" or "current,"
a question arises as to the validity of these classes. One accepted classifi-
cation draws-the line between producer and consumer goods.70 Another
between permanent and fluctuating.71 Essentially the factual difference
involved is a difference in degree of liquidity. Yet this factual difference
is probably less important than the difference in function in the corpora-
tion.7 2  Thus a corporation which bought and sold land, treating it as
inventory, was forced to follow the accounting rules for current assets in
accounting for it.78  What is treated as current assets becomes current
assets.
As liquidity increases, it overshadows the criterion of corporate func-
tion.74 This is probably because the very fact of liquidity makes the cor-
porate function less certain. Thus a security with a ready market may be
bought with the genuine intention of treating it as a long-term investment.
Yet the fact that to all intents and purposes it represents ready cash con-
stantly tempts the management to sell, either to realize a gain or to prevent
a loss. In such a case the intent to treat it as investment or current asset
seems insignificant. The element of liquidity is so great that the question
may well be whether or not the gain or loss has been realized, especially
when securities are distributed as a dividend in kind.7 5 Since one basis
for applying the "current assets" rule is the expectation of a quick realiza-
tion,7 6 the applicability of that rule to highly liquid assets is clear.
65. Note 62 supra.
66. Weiner and Bonbright, note ii supra, 968 indicates that the rules are much
less strictly adhered to in valuing current assets than in valuing fixed assets.
67. Cf. Hutchinson v. Curtiss, 45 Misc. 484, 92 N. Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1904)
(recovery from directors for dividends paid from unrealized profits on contracts).
68. KEHL, op. cit. supra note 12, io9.
69. GRAHAM AND KATZ, op. cit. supra note 7, 184.
70. 2 DEWING, op. ctit. m'pra note 14, 706-713; Weiner and Bonbright, note 39
suPra, 339, n. 19.
71. Ibid.
72. Emphasized in 2 DEwNvG, loc. cit. supra, note 7o.
73. Vogtman v. Merchants' Mortgage and Credit Co., 2o Del. Ch. 364, 178 Atl.
99 (1935).
74. 1 DODD AND Bmxz, op. cit. sura, note 2, 1107.
75. Cf. General Utilities and Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935).
76. Weiner and Bonbright, note ii mtpra, 968.
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Other types of assets may be put into one or the other class for rea-
sons more obviously of policy.77  Good will, for instance, since it represents
in practice a part of the purchase price of fixed assets, is often classified
with them.7 8 Analytically, however, good will is a capitalization of the
amount of income in excess of the normal return on equivalent capital. As
such it decreases as earnings decrease. It is an unreliable asset at best,
and one which conservative management will write down. The rule for
current assets tends to write down an asset more than the rule for fixed
assets. Therefore, as between the two, policy dictates the choice of the
former.
79
5. Effect of Statutes
Since payment of dividends is governed by state statutes, their control
over the law is complete in theory, though less important in fact.80 It is
possible, however, that a carefully-drawn statute might solve some or all of
the problems raised by this note. In examining existing statutes it is
important to note that a majority of corporations are incorporated in com-
paratively few states."' Therefore the pertinent provisions of those states
are generally to be considered.
In the first place, the statute should determine the composition of the
dividend fund. This may be wholly earnings,"2 wholly corporate surplus,8 3
which under a proper accounting system would include unrealized gain, or
the familiar combination allowing payment from earnings despite a capital
deficit if the latter does not impair the dissolution rights of preferred
stock. 84  Which rule, assuming a strict observance by the court, is prefer-
able? Clearly the general scheme of a corporation limits the shareholders
to operating profits 85 and requires that gains in fixed assets be dis-
tributed, if at all, according to the rules for distribution on dissolution.88
This suggests the profits test. However, there still arises the problem of
a capital impairment from a large unrealized loss. Who should bear this
loss ?87 The surplus test throws it on the shareholders; dividends are
withheld until the impairment is made good from earnings. The only
alternative is to write down assets and reduce capital stock,88 thereby forc-
ing creditors to bear the loss, in the form of a diminished "cushion" between
insolvency and the privilege of paying dividends. This would be the natural
effect of the profits test, without revealing it, since evaluation of assets is
unnecessary.
Probably in the case of a drastic reduction in value all parties inter-
ested in the corporate enterprise, both creditors and shareholders, should
77. Weiner and Bonbright, note 39 supra, 339, n. 19.
78. KEHL, op. cit. supra, note 12, 116.
79. Weiner and Bonbright, note II supra, 959.
8o. The only case which treats the problem as one of statutory construction is
Randall v. Bailey, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
81. The exact percentages are set out in Note (194o) 49 YALE L. J. 492, 496, n.
16. The most important states are Delaware, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and New
Jersey.
82. Note 9 supra.
83. Note 8 supra.
84. DEL. REv. CoDE (1935) Ch. 65, § 34. Note that this provision does not pre-
vent payment of dividends from a corporate surplus representing unrealized gain in
assets.
85. And such a test is recommended in i DEWING, op. cit. supra, note 14, 684;
Weiner and Bonbright, note ii supra, 985.
86. Compare majority and dissenting opinions in People v. Travis, 171 App. Div.
521, 157 N. Y. S. (2d) 943 (3d Dept. 1916).
87. KEHL, op. cit. supra note i2, 92 approaches the problem from this standpoint.
88. Note 62 supra and discussion in section 6, p. 345 infra.
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share the loss. The statutes which limit payments from profits while
capital is impaired are the first step in such a program. They mark the
point at which shareholders must begin to bear the load. The second step
would be to correlate statutes governing reduction of capital stock to define
how far creditors could be forced to reduce their cushion and accept a
permanent share of the loss.
Specific statutory provisions on the smaller issues are rare and appar-
ently ineffective. Pennsylvania, a "surplus" jurisdiction, requires that
"losses of every character" be shown.89 If taken at face value,90 this indi-
cates a tendency to make shareholders bear the loss. Yet the same statute
allows only share dividends from unrealized gain, 91 once more penalizing
shareholders for creditors' benefit. There appears to be no theory behind
such random provisions. Apparently they were passed helter-skelter to
check real or fancied abuses of corporate management.
6. A Possible Solution-: The Holding Coptpany Act
From the foregoing sections several desiderata emerge. First is the
need for an efficient method of enforcing whatever rules govern dividends.
Such a method should be preventive rather than remedial in order to avoid
the hardship entailed in setting aside an accomplished transaction. 92  It
should also be unified, in order to avoid the discrepancies between states
and the inevitable rush to incorporate in the most lenient jurisdiction.
9 3
Section 12 (c) of the Holding Company Act " gives the Securities and
Exchange Commission in a limited field power to control payment of divi-
dends which nearly satisfies the above requirements. 5 It is unified, pre-
ventive, and relatively efficient. It has been suggested that the whole act
is an experiment preliminary to a federal incorporation law which would
extend this control over a wider field. 96
Section 12 (c) also satisfies the other need revealed herein, the need
for a flexible administration. Because of idiosyncrasies of corporations, the
common-law method of rules and remedies is essentially unsuited to their
affairs. The wisdom of proposed corporate action may be determined only
after study of its condition from the economic, accounting, and legal points
of view. The Commission can and does make such a study before allow-
ing any corporate distribution. It is free to choose any system of account-
ing. It may prohibit dividends from net earnings,97 or permit dividends
while capital is impaired.98 And it may supervise and control the so-called
"accounting reorganization" involved in a simultaneous write-down of cap-
ital and assets, thus in effect controlling the distribution of loss.
89. 15 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) § 2852-701 (A).
go. Mr. Kehl expects such a holding, KEHL, op. Cit. suprc note 12, 93, but cites
to the contrary Solether and Jennings, Minnesota Busihwss Corporation Act (1937)
12 Wis. L. Rzv. 419, 433 to the effect that such a provision vill be construed to cover
only realized losses.
91. I5 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) § 2852-701 (A).
92. Note (194o) 49 YALE L. J. 492, 515-16.
93. Ibid.
94. 48 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 1 (c) (1941).
95. The Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any registered holding company
. to declare or pay any dividend .. .in contravention of such rules . . .as the
Commission deems necessary . . .to protect the financial integrity of companies in
holding-company systems, to safeguard the working capital of public-utility companies,
to prevent the payment of dividends out of capital or unearned surplus. .. ."
For a more deailed analysis see KEHL, op. cit. supra, note 12, 76-81; Note (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 492.
96. Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 492, 493, n. 3.
97. Columbia Gas and Elec. Corp., 3 S. E. C. 313, 319 (1938).
98. International Utilities Corporation, 7 S. E. C. 201 (1940).
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Decisions under Section 1:2 (c) are too few to allow more than a rough
sketch of results. Apparently the Commission endorses evaluating by cap-
italization of expected earnings.99 And the chief accountant has declared
specifically that "relatively permanent" losses must be shown. 00
The method of treating such losses after they are revealed is not defi-
nite. The Commission has allowed the cancellation of unrealized losses
against unrealized gains,' 0' a result which, though theoretically impossible
at common law where neither are recognized, had one precedent under
state law. 0 2 The Commission has recognized accounting reorganizations,
but has refused to allow subsequent dividend payments where the reorgan-
ization was not so "thorough-going" as to be equivalent to the formation
of a new company. 03 In the only case yet decided, the so-called "account-
ing reorganization" was accomplished by writing off against capital surplus
an operating deficit which in turn was caused by a retroactive adjust-
ment of a previous entry.0' Whether the adjustment was necessary
because of a loss in value, a previous over-valuation, or a decline in price
level is uncertain. Apparently the Commission took the view that it was
purely an "earned surplus deficit," resulting from an operating loss, and
refused to allow its cancellation against capital surplus. 0 5 It was a loss
that shareholders should bear and could not be shifted to creditors by
charging capital. The case has been treated as involving a loss in the worth
of fixed assets due to a lowered price level, and criticized as such for not
putting that "loss" on the creditors by charging capital.'00 But the facts
do not support this view, and dicta in the opinion discussing "accounting
reorganizations" clearly indicate that a proper write-down of fixed assets
may be charged against capital.10 7  There is no evidence to indicate how
the Commission will spread a loss which reflects a decline in relative value
rather than in the price level.
The importance of the case seems to lie in its demonstration of how
the Commission can untangle a complicated factual set-up and arrive at an
economically sound result. It is unfettered by procedural rules. The plain-
tiff is not an impecunious stockholder but the Public Utilities Division.
The Commission is free to impose whatever system of accounting best
serves its purpose and whatever definition of dividend fund is best for this
corporation. In short, it is able to face the problem unhampered by the
difficulties of procedure and practice which have rendered a legal solution
nearly impossible.
F. L. B., Jr.
Valuation of Restricted Shares for Tax Purposes
INTRODUCTION
Determination of taxable "net income" under the federal income tax
may require computation of the "fair market value" of property received.
The estate tax, imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of every de-
99. Note (1940) 49 YAIs L. J. 492, 51o, n. 67.
ioo. Quoted in Note (940) 49 YALE L. J. 1319, 1322.
Ioi. Philadelphia Co., 6 S. E. C. 752 (1940).
iO. Titus v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 2 Tenn. App. 184 (1925).
lO3. Associated Gas and Elec. Corp., 6 S. E. C. 6o5, 62o (194o).
lo4. Id. at 614.
io5. Id. at 619.
io6. KEHL, op cit. supra, note 12, 98, n. 39.
io7. See Associated Gas and Elec. Corp., 6 S. E. C. 6o5, 622 (294o).
2. INT. REv. CoDE § iii (b) (1939).
NOTES
cedent,2 by administrative interpretation similarly involves determination
of the "fair market value" of every item of property includable in the gross
estate at the time of decedent's death.3 In the same way, the gift tax
imposed upon the transfer of property by gift has been interpreted to re-
quire determination of "fair market value" of each unit of property.4 The
measure of value to be employed is stated in other words in other statutes,5
but the courts have almost invariably held that the legislative meaning is
"fair market value." 1
Fair market value of corporate shares may be affected by contractual
restrictions upon power to transfer.7  The incumbrance may take the form
of an option in the corporation to repurchase the shares at a figure less
than market value at a determinable future time," or at the time of some
attempted disposition by the holder.' It may take the form of a restriction
on the number of possible purchasers.1 0 Or it may involve an absolute
restriction on disposition for a limited period.1
It has been suggested by some courts that such restrictive contracts,
although valid for other purposes between the contracting parties, do not
affect determination of the tax value of the share interest unless contained
in the corporate charter or by-laws, or set out on the face of the share
certificate.1 2  Such a formalistic conception of the corporate share can
hardly be supported. When a taxpayer receives or transfers in a taxable
transaction a corporate share subject to burden on rights of alienability,
2. INT. REV. CODE § 810 (939).
3. U. S. Treas. Reg. 8o, Art. io.
4. U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(i).
5. "True and full value in money," "full and true value immediately," "value,"
"clear market value on death," "market value," "fair market value," "net market
value" are variously used, 4 C. C. H. 1941 State Inheritance, Estate, and Gift Tax
Serv. f1 i8ooA.
6. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1937) 171. Fair market value is "the
price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell." U. S. Treas. Reg. 8o, Art
iO; U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. ig(i). PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (1937)
171.
7. General discussion of the problem may be found in 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION
OF PROPERTY (Ist ed., 1937) I04o et seq. (income tax); HUGHES, FEDmRA DEATH TAX
(1938) § z6g; PAUL, STrUDIsS IN FEDERAI TAXATION (1937) 212 et seq.; PAUL AND
MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 52.22; Note (1936) 1O2 A. L. R. 6, 21.
8. See cases cited notes 21 and 22 infra.
9. The form is ordinarily a requirement that shareholder offer to the corporation
for a period of days or months before attempting to sell or otherwise transfer. See
cases cited notes 28, 29, and 31 infra.
io. See cases cited notes 4o and 43 infra.
ii. See cases cited notes 52 to 56 infra.
12. In Bryant v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 291 Mass. 498, 501,
197 N. E. 509, 511 (1935), the argument is set forth in some detail. "The limitation
was not inherent in the stock itself. . . . It was extraneous to the stock although
accompanying its acquisition by the taxpayer. . . . The full and complete ownership
. vested in the taxpayer at the time of the exchange. . . . tax laws cannot be
frustrated or rendered difficult of enforcement by contracts lying outside the essential
features of a sale of stock." There is a good deal of language to this general effect
in the decisions of the Board and in Federal cases. See G. & K. Mfg. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 76 F. (2d) 454, 456 (1935) ; Newman v. Commissioner 41 F. (2d) 743, 744
(1930); T. W. Henritze, 28 B. T. A. 1173, 1176 (1933); City Bank Farmers Trust
Co., 3 B. TA. 663 (193i). See (1935) U. OF PA. L. REv. 1O28, IO3O suggesting that
all restrictions be ignored for tax purposes.
There is substantial disagreement as to when a restriction may be said to be
"inherent." See T. W. Henritze, 28 B. T. A. 1173, 1176 (1933) (restrictions stamped
on share certificate not inherent); see Attorney-General v. Jameson [19o4] 2 Ir.
Rep. 565, 69o, 691 (restriction in articles not inherent. Dissenting opinion).
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he receives or transfers but a part of a divided property interest,'8 and
should not fairly be asked to pay a tax measured on the whole interest. 4
If the restriction is in fact unenforceable, or intended not to be exercised,
and the fact is proved, then the divided interest only apparently exists; and
the whole share value should be taxable.15  However, it is possible that
even an unenforceable restriction might have an apparent validity such as
to reduce the value of the right to sell the shares in the same manner as
a cloud on title of real estate.
OPTION TO PURCHASE AT LESs THAN MARKET VALUE
Control over the persons who shall own shares of a corporation is
often exercised by existing shareholders by means of a reserved option
right to repurchase the share at market value -1 or less in the event that
a holder desires to dispose of his shares. 17 The device is not unusual in
small corporations where it is desired that ownership be limited to the
families or associates of existing shareholders. It is also employed in
shares issued to employees in order to ensure their loyalty to the issuing
corporation, such restriction providing, in addition to restriction on sale,
for reservation of option in the corporation which may be exercised when
the employee leaves the corporate employ.' 8
If, at the time it passes on exchange, gift, or death, and becomes sub-
ject to the tax, the share is subject to an immediate option in corporation
to purchase at less than value, the taxable value of the interest which
passes is determined by the price at which the recipient must sell it under
the option.' 9 The contingent option becomes separated from the share at
13. "Compared with the absolute right to go into the open market and sell . . .
property that was subject to no restrictions on alienation-present or future--this
interest was what I may venture to call a dwarfed and stunted thing." Kenny, J., in
Attorney-General v. Jameson [19o4] 2 Ir. Rep. 644, 673.
14. "Such an argument [as that in dicta cited in note 12] can proceed only on the
theory that it is the duty of the Courts to so construe the Revenue Law as to make
it prolific of revenue. . . ." HuGHES, FEDERAL DEAl"H TAX (1938) § I6g, p. 302.
The argument has apparently gone by the boards in both England, see cases cited
note 29 infra, and the United States.
15. As to validity and enforceability of restrictions on corporate shares in general
see cases and materials cited in FREY, CASES AND STATUTES ON BUSINESS AssociA-
TIONS (935) 376. No case has apparently yet involved assertion of invalidity, by tax-
payer, of a restriction in a share transferred to him. Taxpayer ordinarily asserts va-
lidity.
16. Of course mere option to purchase at highest offered market price would not
appreciably affect market value despite possible inconvenience. Cf. Jay N. Darling,
4 B. T. A. 499 (1926). Query what result in the situation where optionee is to deter-
mine "fair market value" himself'
17. The option may inhibit only power of sale; or it may hamper power to give
or devise as well.
i8. See e. g., Charles T. Kline, 44 B. T. A. No. 161, July 19, 1941.
19. Commissioner v. Bensel, Ioo F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), affg, Edith M.
Bensel, 36 B. T. A. 246 (1937); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F. (2d) 682 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932), aff'g, Wilson v. Bowers, 51 F. (2d) 261 (S. D. N. Y., 1931); John Mitchell,
37 B. T. A. i (1938). The possibility that the option will not be exercised is not
relevant if the enforceable power to obtain the shares for less than their market price
is outstanding in the hands of optionee. A valuable part of the share interest is in the
hands of optionee and on this he can be taxed. Moran v. Lucas, 36 F. (2d) 546 (App.
D. C. ig2g). The dictum in Wil.on v. Bowers, that evidence that option was in fact
not exercised was barred by the rule against evidence of subsequent happenings, would
not be necessary under this view. Query the result in a situation where it is clear
at time as of which tax is computed, that option will not be exercised, although the
legal right remains in optionee. Cf. Charles T. Kline, 44 B. T. A. No. 161, p. 5,
July 19, 1941 (evidence that option not intended to be asserted).
NOTES
the time of the option contract, remains throughout in the hands of optionee,
and so does not pass on death, gift, or exchange.20
If the option right is not then immediately exercisable, the value of
the shareholder's interest will probably be larger than option price. If
the option is to be exercised at a determined future time, the value to the
shareholder would probably be accurately represented by a figure com-
posed of the sum of present value of any prospective earnings of the share
in the interval, plus present value of the expectation of receiving option
price on the determined date.2 - If the option is one which may be exer-
cised upon death of shareholder, the expectable yield of the share in the
interval may be roughly computed by an estimate of the life expectancy of
the shareholder at the moment of the gift or exchange. 22  Determination
of the period during which the shareholder may expect to receive the bene-
ficial incidents of ownership may be yet more speculative, as when the
option is to become immediate upon his leaving the corporate employ.
23
An option may be one which attaches only upon attempted disposi-
tion of the share by the holder. The value of the share interest to the
holder under such a restriction should vary inversely with that portion
of the value of the whole share which would be represented by the absent
powers of disposal. Power of disposition by gift or will would perhaps
always be incidents of some value. Power of sale in the open market
might be a large or small incident of value as to the particular security.
24
The investor in shares of a sound, strategically well situated corporation
with high earnings and satisfactory dividend policies might well ignore
the power of sale on the open market as a value factor.25
If a substantial portion of the value of the ordinary security is repre-
sented by saleability on the market, the value of the shareholder's remain-
ing interest would best be computed by looking at all relevant factors, such
as earnings, stability, control, strategic position, pre-emptive rights, option
price, dividend policy, and perhaps managerial skill, and arriving at an
estimate of what it would be worth to a hypothetical buyer to be placed
in the shoes of the holder as to that stock.
26
2o. Contra: Palles, C. B., dissenting, in Attorney General of Ireland v. Jameson
[19o4] 2 Ir. Rep. 644, 682 et seq.
21. However, in Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. io6 (1936) option price was held
determinative in the following circumstances. Corporation transferred to taxpayer in
1922, shares of "intrinsic value" $1,16470 for $IOO each, in return for a covenant not
to compete and an option to repurchase the shares at $ioo, 5/7 in 1923, 4/7 in 1924, etc.
Taxpayer asserted a basis of $1,164.7o per share on a subsequent transfer of the
shares. The Commissioner successfully contended that price for which taxpayer might
be obliged to resell in 1923 fixed the value of the shares received by taxpayer. It was
not argued that possible earnings of shares in the one year interval might have some
effect. Query whether the same result would have been reached had it been shown
that earnings were to be expected in the period taxpayer had a right to retain the
shares. In Charles T. Kline, 44 B. T. A. No. 16I, July i9, 1941, the option was to be
exercised on death of donor. Value of gift of share was computed to be greater than
option price, and taxpayer's contention that option price should govern. was rejected.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. When "entire record affirmatively indicates the probability of his con-
tinued employment" possibility of exercise of the option is discounted.
24. "Power of unrestricted alienation is a usual concomitant of ownership of
property. When such power is separated from the ownership the value of the prop-
erty, certainly as a trading commodity, is usually lessened ... " Frederick A. Koch,
28 B. T. A. 363, 365 (933).
25. "Power of alienation, or its absence, would not affect the value of property
in the hands of one who wished not to sell." Id., at 366. In the Koch case taxpayer
asserted that option price determined tax value. The corporation had been formed to
construct a particular building, and it did not appear that shares were intended to be
sold.
26. See generally, Phillips v. U. S., 32 F. (2d) 598, 603 (W. D. Pa., 1926) ; At-
torney General v. Jameson [19O5] 2 Ir. Rep. 218, at 227; HUGHEs, FEDERAL DEATH
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Option price would equal value of the restricted shares only in case
power of disposition were the sole valuable incident of share ownership.
27
Where a higher valuation is set with regard to value factors, it will be
supported by the Board.'2  The same rule obtains as to tax statutes of
other jurisdictions.
2 9
In Lomb v. Sugden,30 however, the Circuit Court for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed a district court which had upheld a finding of the Commis-
sioner based on consideration of the value factors above mentioned,"' and
held the option price determinative. The view seems questionable.3 2  A
similar view, but one more plausible under the words of the English stat-
ute,83 was rejected by the H-louse of Lords in Inland Revenue Commis-
sioners v. Crossman.34 The English estate tax provides for valuation of
the estate according to "the price" the commissioners think the property
will fetch in the open market.85 The language of the statute induced the
majority of the King's Bench to hold that tax value could be no greater
than the price at which the property could be sold, i. e., option price, de-
spite the fact that earnings of the shares were extremely high. 6 The
House of Lords resolved the problem by reiterating the rule of Attorney
General of Ireland v. Jameson,17 that market "price" under the statute
means value of shareholder's interest,38 and upheld a determination of tax
value based upon consideration of all relevant factors.39
TAx (1938) § 162, at 275 et seq. The customary method for valuing close stock is
employed, with the added consideration of the absence of alienation rights as a de-
pressant factor.
27. If the circumstances of the holder were to make it necessary that he sell the
property at the time the valuation is made, query whether the concept of "value to
the owner" would be employed? What of an executor if the property has to be
divided?
28. Frederick A. Koch, 28 B. T. A. 363 (1933) ; Michigan Trust Co., 27 B. T. A.
556 (1933) ; City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 23 B. T. A. 663 (1931) ; Louis N. Schulz,
14 B. T. A. 419 (1928). The Michigan Trist case distinguishes Wilson v. Bowers on
the immediacy point. The distinction is seldom clearly made in the opinions. The
results are in part fostered by the presumption of commissioner's correctness.
29. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Worcester County Trust Co.,
305 Mass. 460, 26 N. E. (2d) 305 (1940) in which the point is clearly made. Inland
Revenue Commissioners v. Crossman et al [1937] A. C. 26; Salvesen's Trustees v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue [393o] i Scots. L. T. 387; Attorney General of
Ireland v. Jameson [19O5] 2 Ir. Rep. 218.
30. 82 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
31. Lomb v. Sugden, ii F. Supp. 472 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
32. Implicit in the holding is perhaps a realization of the convenience of the option
price as an index. Query the reaction of the second circuit to a case should yearly
earnings be 20% or higher, as in the Irish and English cases cited note 29 supra. In
Helmholz, 28 B. T. A. 165, 175 (1933) the Board held, where a poor dividend record
was shown, and the state appraiser had valued at IOO (option price), that commis-
sioner's determination of value at 320 could not be supported but that IOO was the
proper value. In the circumstances it is probable that the value of the shares was in fact
no greater than option price.
33. Finance Act, 57 and 58 Vict. c. 30, § 1, § 7 (1894).
34. [I937] A. C. 26.
35. "The principal value of any property shall be estimated to be the price which,
in the opinion of the Commissioners, such property would fetch if sold in the open
market at the time of the death of the deceased." Finance Act, 57 and 58 Vict. c. 30
§7 (5).
36. In re Paulin, In re Crossman [1935] I K. B. 26, (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV.
1028.
37. [19o5] 2 Ir. Rep. 218.
38. The estimated price which a hypothetical buyer would pay to be placed in the
shoes of the shareholder.
39. The Commissioner had claimed that the restriction should have no effect. The
taxpayer had asserted that option price should limit tax value. The court properly
held both views extreme.
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RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER TO ONE OUTSIDE A DETERMINED OR
DETERMINABLE GROUP
Restrictions on power of alienation may take the form of prohibition
of transfer outside of a certain group,40 or of absolute restriction on trans-
fer without consent of the members of the group.41  Such restrictions
sometimes replace the option as a means by which control of the persons
who shall obtain corporate membership may be exercised by existing share-
holders.4 2 They may, applied to voting shares, be employed as devices to
preserve control of a corporation in the majority group.
43
Under these circumstances, again, if the incident of transferability of
the share is a negligible incident, its presence or absence might not affect
tax value. If power of alienation is a valuable portion of the share inter-
est, the extent to which it is impaired by the particular restriction is impor-
tant.44
That all the shareholders in the group agree that shares shall not be
sold without consent of the group, ordinarily indicates, in the absence of
adverse interests among the various members, that the restriction will not
be enforced if it becomes a burden decreasing the value of the shares.
45
Taxpayer may of course show that the fact is otherwise, if he can sustain
the burden of proof. As a general proposition it may nevertheless be said
that this type of restriction is unlikely to be asserted successfully as a factor
reducing tax value.46
The price at which the property may be disposed of in a market lim-
ited to a particular group may be no lower, or may be in particular cases
even higher, than the price at which it could be sold in the open market.47
40. Estate of Nieman, 230 Wis. 23, 28, N. W. 452 (1939) (group limited to those
who would carry on ideals of the business) ; R. E. Baker, 37 B. T. A. 1135, 1155 (1938)
(employees).
41. See cases cited note 43 infra.
T . Estate of Nieman, 230 Wis. 23, 283 N. W. 452 (1939) ; R. E. Baker, 37 B.
T. A. 1135, 1155 (1938) ; Henry K. Chapin, 33 B. T. A. 688 (1935).
43. Newman v. Commissioner, 4o F. (2d) 225, aff'd on rehearing, 41 F. (2d) 743
(C. C. A. ioth, 1930) ; Rodrigues v. Edwards, 4o F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o)
(employee shares) ; Heiner v. Crosby, 24 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928) ; Phillips v.
U. S., 12 F. (2d) 598 (W. D. Pa. 1926), aff'd, Phillips v. U. S., 24 F. (2d) 195
(C. C. A. 3d, 1928).
44. Requirement of third party consent of course does not bar negotiation. It
may reduce value dependent on the circumstances, but the burden of proof is on tax-
payer who asserts the lowered value. Rodrigues v. Edwards, 4o F. (2d) 4o8 (C. C. A.
2d, 1930), af'g, 33 F. (2d) 1003 (1929) (taxpayer argued only that restriction de-
stroyed tax value, and so, of course, lost).
45. Newman v. Commissioner, 4o F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. ioth, 1930), aff'd on re-
hearing, Newman v. Commissioner, 41 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. Ioth, I93O); Henry K.
Chapin, 33 B. T. A. 688 (I935). '
46. In the Nieman case, note 4o supra, the facts were that shares controlling a
newspaper were left to executor with directions that they be sold only to one who
would carry out decedent's ideals. Apparently no inquiry was made among the hypo-
thetical group which would qualify before selling to A, who qualified. Offers at
considerably higher figures than that paid by A were available from B, C, and Mr.
Annenberg. Offers of these parties were considered in computing fair market value.
The court indicated in dictum that it would have reached the same result even had A
been the bona fide highest bidder of the qualified group. If so, this is a rather harsh
view. Compare note 27 supra.
47. In Henry K. Chapin, 33 B. T. A. 688 (1935) a corporation formed to construct
a cooperative apartment house in an exclusive section of Chicago and market apart-
ments therein, was attempting to set up a restriction on transfer of shares to persons
unapproved as prospective tenants by the corporate members. The Board properly
held that the restriction created no burden on marketability, since the restrictions,
though limiting prospective buyers to a smaller group than otherwise would have been
the case, so limited the market only for the reason that the restricted market was active
and could be expected to offer a much higher return on the shares than could be ob-
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Further, although it be impossible to market successfully the share in the
restricted group, the presence of the restriction may result in added value
to the shareholder which more than compensates for the absence of the
usual power to dispose of his interest. Thus, where the restriction is in-
tended to maintain voting control of a corporation in the majority group
of shareholders, the value of the share so restricted may be computed to
be a fraction of the value of the controlling interest, plus its other inci-
dents of value; and, as such, to have a higher tax value than unrestiicted
shares.
48
ABSOLUTE REsrRICTIONS FOR LImiTED PERIODS
In exchange for a transfer of shares or assets to a corporation, the
taxpayer may receive shares of the corporation subject to an absolute re-
striction on sale or alienation for a period of months or years. The bal-
ance of shares of the issuing corporation remain on the market unre-
stricted during the restrictive period. Sales of unrestricted shares may
well be an approximate index of fair market value of those received by
taxpayer if it appears from the surrounding circumstances that (a) the
marketing of unrestricted shares is not being artificially supported, and (b)
that the temporary absence of rights of alienation is not a sufficiently im-
portant factor to reduce value of restricted shares below that of the unre-
stricted shares in any event. Accordingly, shares received in such an
exchange by a taxpayer, who agreed to participate in a projected sale of
the assets of the issuing corporation to another organization and to hold
his shares for ninety days while the deal was being negotiated, were held
in G. & K. Mfg. Co. v. Conm'r 4 9 to be properly valued for income tax
at the market price of unrestricted shares. The court stated that the
surrounding circumstances 'o were sufficient to remove a usual presumption
that presence of a restriction lowers the fair market value of shares subject
thereto.
Language may be found in this, as in other decisions and rulings, to
the effect that a restriction "voluntarily entered into" by the taxpayer can-
not destroy or reduce the tax value of his shares. 51 It hardly seems that
the voluntary nature of such a contract should affect the fact if the share-
tained by unrestricted sales. The Board took into account that the restrictions would
unquestionably be removed upon any substantial drying up of the exclusive market,
and buttressed its conclusion by evidence that subsequently such was the case.
48. In Phillips v. U. S., 12 F. (2d) 598 (W. D. Pa., 1926), aff'd, Phillips v.
U. S., 24 F. (2d) 195 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); and Heiner v. Crosby, 24 F. (2d) 19I
(C. C. A. 3d, 1928) 51% of the shares of Pure Oil had entered into a covenant not
to sell for 20 years. A few of the remaining shares were sold in the market, and the
Treasury attempted to establish market value of such shares as determinative of the
value of the restricted share. The taxpayer successfully asserted a higher value in
establishing a 1913 basis for the shares. (See language on p. 603 of the Phillips case
in the District Court). In Newman v. Coinrn'r, 4o F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. ioth, 1930)
the Commissioner valued a share at its worth as a part of the controlling interest of
the corporation which could have been sold for $2.o0 a share. The fact that controlling
shareholders would neither consent to sell, nor permit sale of taxpayer's shares alone
was held not to rebut the Commissioner's valuation.
49. 76 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
5o. Shares were transferred to taxpayer corporation to be held for ninety days,
until a projected merger of issuing corporation, which was to be advantageous to all
shareholders, restricted or not. The price of unrestricted shares rose steadily until
the merger was successfully consummated. Power to sell the share during the ninety
days could hardly have been very important in the circumstances.
51. ". . . a voluntary agreement to abstain from the sale or transfer of property
received in a sale or exchange need not be considered in determining the market value
of the property received." G. & K. Mfg. Co., 76 F. (2d) 454, 457 (C. C. A. 4th,
1935). See note 12 supra.
NOTES
holder does receive something of less value than an unrestricted share
because he has contracted with an adversely interested party not to receive
a property right ordinarily incident to ownership of the share. The typical
situation involves the launching of a new enterprise, wherein shares of the
new corporation go part to syndicate bankers to be sold to the public; and
part to shareholders of the old corporation, subject to a restriction on
transfer coextensive with projected syndicate operations. The price of
unrestricted shares does not ordinarily reflect in fact the value of the
restricted share to its holder. If the intrinsic worth of the corporation
does not justify the market price of the unrestricted shares, it is probable
that the restricted shares on the termination of syndicate operations will
not be saleable at that figure.
Where, in such a situation, the Board is able to determine from the
dealings of the parties to the transaction what value was placed by them
upon the shares so restricted, that figure is adopted.52  In a situation, for
example, where in the general fact situation above outlined, the taxpayer
is given the choice of receiving, instead of one-half the number of shares
of the new corporation contracted for, a stated amount of cash, and in fact
takes both shares and cash, the value so computed in contemplation of the
restriction on the shares by the parties most familiar with the circum-
stances may be taken as determinative.58 Such dealings to be of value
must, of course, be as to shares to be restricted. Price paid by the syndi-
cate for unrestricted shares should not be persuasive.
54
Ordinarily such apparent method of valuation is unavailable. If the
fact is so, and the Commissioner finds fair market value equal to the
market price of unrestricted shares, that valuation may stand on the
strength of the presumption of correctness of the Commissioner's find-
ings 15 unless the taxpayer makes available to the Board evidence of the
intrinsic value of the Corporation's assets and so permits the establish-
ment of a lower valuation.58
The principle that evidence of subsequent events should not be taken
into account in determining fair market value as of the date of the trans-
action is sometimes of importance in this connection. Prices of shares
after completion of the syndicate operations may or may not be admissible,
dependent on the circumstances. A decline in prices after the restriction
terminates may tend to show that the price of unrestricted shares during
the syndicate operations is no true index of their intrinsic value at that
time and a fortiori no indication of the tax value of restricted shares not
possessing advantages of saleability in the inflated market.5 7 The decline
may, on the other hand, do no more than reflect a general fall of market
52. Bassick et at. v. Comm'r, 85 F. (2d) 8 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), aff'g, Wilbur F.
Bums, 3o B. T. A. 163 (1934); Henry S. Parker, ii B. T. A. 1336 (I928).
53. Iid.
54. E. F. Simms, 28 B. T. A. 988, ioi8 (933).
55. G. & K. Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935);
Fesler v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) i55 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930) ; Western Industries
Co., 3o B. T. A. 8o9 (1933); T. W. Henritze, 28 B. T. A. 1173 (1933); see Min-
nesota Tea Co., 28 B. T. A. 59i, 596 (1933).
56. E. F. Simms, 28 B. T. A. 988, ioi6, ioi8 (I933); Wallis Tractor Co., 3
B. T. A. 981 (1925); see Western Industries Co., 3o B. T. A. 8og, 813 (1933).
57. In every case found involving sale of unrestricted shares while shares sought
to be taxed were subject to restriction, the price of shares after termination of the
syndicate operations and concurrent restrictive period was considered. Tex-Penn
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), is a square holding to
the effect that such evidence is proper in order to show speculative nature of the
enterprise whose shares are being sold at prices unjustified by corporate prospects.
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prices at the time, which latter fact should have no effect on determination
of value as of the date of the transaction.58
The taxpayer's evidence of fair market value lower than that estab-
lished by the Commissioner must, it seems, consist of something more than
testimony of expert witnesses to the effect that the value of taxpayer's
interests could not have been sold for more than a nominal price at the
time of the transaction without delivery of possession of the share. The
standard of market value seems to give way to that of value to the owner
in such case. The question of the value of the interest held by taxpayer
is not precluded by the fact that it is temporarily unsaleable. 59 The tax-
payer may not safely rely on book value, but should apparently be pre-
pared to show exhaustively the intrinsic value of the corporation's assets. 60
They are valued by the Board by no specific set of rules, but on the basis




Although the presence of contractual prohibitions of, or limitations
on, transfer had prior to 1938 been uniformly held not to have the effect
of removing "fair market value" from a corporate share,62 there were deci-
sions to the effect that the nature of a corporation might be so speculative
that its shares even in the absence of restrictions would have no fair mar-
ket value. It was held that no taxable gain arose for this reason in trans-
actions involving shares of a corporation whose assets consisted of oil land
the title to which was subject to litigation of adverse claims which,
if successful, would not only have eliminated its assets but have subjected
it to serious liability as well,683 in transactions involving shares of highly
speculative stock based on oil leases which could only be sold at a sacri-
fice,64 and in transactions involving shares supported by heavily encum-
bered realty.6 5
With the general background as stated, the question was raised in
Tex-Penn Oil Co. v. Comm'r 66 whether restricted shares of a corporation,
whose future was highly speculative because of the nature of its assets,
might be held to have no fair market value even though a ready market
existed for the unrestricted portion of the shares. Taxpayer's assets con-
sisted of "wildcat" oil leases. Oil had been discovered on the land, and
a capitalization project thereafter carried out, by the terms of which the
58. However, drop in market prices coincident with the 1929 market collapse was
considered in cases cited, notes 67 to 70 infra.
59. The argument that removal of power to sell a regular interest in an orderly
market does away with fair market value was made in almost every case, and consist-
ently rebuffed. Fesler v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930) ; T. W.
Henritze, 28 B. T. A. 1173 (1933) ; Western Industries Co., 3o B. T. A. 8o9 (1933).
Query whether the Tex-Penn decision has now made the argument respectable.
6o. Book value is one of the most unreliable indices of value, yet taxpayers based
their valuations thereon in Western Industries Co., 3o B. T. A. 8o9 (1933) ; T. W.
Henritze, 28 B. T. A. 1173 (1933). In Western Industries Co. shares of book value
$4.05 had earned $1.85 in the nine months previous to the valuation.
61. E. F. Simms, 28 B. T. A. 988 (1933) ; Wallis Tractor Co., 3 B. T. A. 981
(1925). Contra: Tex-Penn Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 5i8 (C. C. A. 3d
9312. See note 59 supra.
63. Champlin v. Commissioner, 71 F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A. ioth, 1934).
64. O'Meara v. Commissioner, 34 F. (2d) 390, 395 (C. C. A. ioth, 1929).
65. Mount v. Commissioner, 48 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) rev'g I6 B. T. A.
847 (1929). These cases were decided with emphasis on wording of statute "fair
market value, if any." Query whether same result follows now.
66. 300 U. S. 481, aff'g, Tex-]?enn Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 518 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1939), which reversed 28 B. T. A. 917 (1933).
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oil leases were conveyed to a new corporation, part of whose shares were
received in exchange subject to six months restriction on transfer if syndi-
cate operations contemplating sale of unrestricted shares should continue
so long. The Board of Tax Appeals after study of the intrinsic assets
of the new corporation in order to determine fair market value of its shares,
and on "studied consideration of all pertinent facts and applicable factors",
reached a valuation for the property at the date of the exchange. The
Circuit Court, expressly considering the fact that the enterprise "blew up"
before the end of the restrictive period, determined that the shares had
no fair market value. On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that "the
judgments must be affirmed upon the ground that in the peculiar circum-
stances of this case, the shares of Transcontinental stock, regard being had
to their high speculative quality and to the terms of a restrictive agreement
making a sale thereof impossible, did not have a fair market value, capable
of being ascertained with reasonable certainty, when they were so acquired
by the taxpayers. In the absence of such value, the ownership of the shares
did not lay the basis for computation of a gain at the time they were re-
ceived, or for a tax as to that date under the applicable statute."
Four considerations are mentioned in the opinion: (i) peculiar factors
of the case, (2) highly speculative quality of the shares, (3) terms of the
restrictive agreement, and (4) the applicable statute. Later cases have
revealed considerable uncertainty as to what similar combinations of fact
should impel a like conclusion.
The absolute restriction for a limited period of time, it must be remem-
bered, is typical of the period of launching of a corporate enterprise.
Every new corporation involves some element of speculation. A loose
interpretation of the Tex-Penn rule might conceivably remove almost
every transaction of this type from income tax liability. How much element
of speculation is necessary to bring a given situation within the rule may
cause some difficulty.
In the Tex-Penn case the nature of the corporate assets was responsible
for the speculative nature of its shares. In State Street Trust Company,671
a corporate unit of an unstable holding company pyramid, whose shares
were subject to violent fluctuations, was held to be within the rule. In
Morris D. Kopple,8 dissension among the shareholders was the only point
indicating speculative nature. In Schuh Trading Company,69 the new cor-
poration was a holding company engaged in buying up some sixty whole-
sale drug companies. The court stated that since the corporation was a
new enterprise, without officers experienced as to operations on such a
vast scale, "with a future wholly unknown," and stock "as yet unseasoned,"
it fell within the scope of the Tex-Penn case.70 In fact, however, the rea-
soning of the court does not align with the Tex-Penn case, for the court did
find a value for the shares, equal to market price after the conclusion of
the syndicate operations.
In Gzinner v. Heiner,71 the court held that where the occasion of the
restriction is an issue of securities of an established and sound corpora-
67. 37 F. Supp. 846 (D. Mass. i941).
68. 34 B. T. A. io56 (1937).
69. 95 F. (2d) 4o4 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
70. See Morris D. Kopple, 34 B. T. A. io56, io63 (1937).
71. I14 F. (2d) 723 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), rev'g Gwinner v. Heiner, 25 F. Supp.
659 (W. D. Pa. 1938). The district court had stated that "to fix a fair market value
on this stock . . .during the term of the restrictive agreement would be unfair to the
government in the determining of the gain or loss from the transaction because the
price of such stock would necessarily not be its fair market value. [Italics added.]
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tion, there should be no question but that fair market value exists if the
restriction is not of too long duration.
The Tex-Penn decision settled that presence- of a restrictive agree-
ment may, in conjunction with some speculative character of the security
which appears likely to prevent ultimate realization of gain, prevent valua-
tion as of the date securities are received for income tax purposes. In
Propper v. Commissioner,72 a further step was taken when a prohibition
of sale of shares of an apparently sound corporation for five years was
held determinative of the fact that the shares had no fair market value.
This case stands alone in placing sole emphasis on the restrictive agreement.
It is, however, worthy of note that in the Tex-Penn case the restriction
was at most six months in duration, and in the cases following, although
none involved restrictions of less than six months, the longest was one year.
It is questionable whether valuation will be prevented in the case of
anything less than absolute prohibition of rights of disposition of the share."3
If the form of restriction is, for example, prohibition of sale outside a group,
prices obtainable within the group might determine if higher than "sacri-
fice" prices.7 4 Where consent of another to any disposition is necessary it
becomes important, in the case of a speculative share, how easily the consent
can be obtained. As a procedural matter the onus is apparently on the tax-
payer to show futile attempts to obtain consent.7 5
Tex-Penn purports to deal only with "the applicable statute." It may
be surmised that the rule, if it is carried over to estate or gift taxes at
all, will not be there extended.7 6  For as to the income tax there is a
str6ng possibility that if property is not taxed as income at the time of
the transaction, collection of the tax may be but postponed to a later date.77
As to estate and gift taxes, if value is found absent at the date the trans-
action occurs, the property wholly escapes taxation.
CONCLUSION
If a contract is made by a. shareholder to refrain from exercising some
of the rights of transferability ordinarily incident to ownership of a cor-
porate share, and the contract: is enforceable and intended to be enforced
when made, the value of that share for tax purposes is probably lessened.
The extent to which this is so depends upon how much of the normal
power of unrestricted alienation is removed by the particular restriction,
and how valuable the absent :powers are as to the particular share under
the circumstances of the case. The value of a share crippled by the
72. 89 F. (2d) 6,7 (C. C. A. .d, 1937).
73. R. E. Baker, 37 B. T. A. 1135, 1155 (1938). Taxpayer claimed that cost
basis could not be allocated between A & B shares because sale of B shares was
restricted to employees. There were sales of shares among the 41 employees. In
concluding shares had a market value the court distinguished the Tex-Penn, Propper,
and Kopple cases on the fact that each involved absolute restriction.
74. Ibid.
75. State Street Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 37 F. Supp. 846 (D. Mass. I94).
The court here was convinced that no consent could have been obtained. Compare
Bryant v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 291 Mass. 498, 197 N. E. 509
(1935) in which no such showing was made, and taxpayer lost, although the transac-
tion was identical in both cases.
76. In the Kline case involving the gift tax, Tex-Pennr was distinguished on other
grounds. Charles T. Kline, 44 B. T. A., No. 161, July i9, 1941. In John Mitchell which
dealt with immediate option to purchase under the estate tax the case was not cited,
John Mitchell, 37 B. T. A., (1938).
77. See HUGHEs, FnmAw, DEATH TAx (1938) § 147.
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absence of alienation rights must be determined by a selective weighing
of all the factors bearing on the value the particular share would represent
to a potential buyer. In the case of an immediate option to purchase, or
in a case where dealings by the parties as to the share as restricted may
afford a clue to its value, an accurate short cut method of evaluation may
be available. Option prices, or the sale price of ordinary securities of the
same issue do not otherwise ordinarily furnish a reliable basis for evaluat-
ing worth of the share. Since such figures will then only fortuitously re-
flect the actual value of the interest to be valued, convenience alone should
not induce their adoption.
The difficulties of reaching a workable basis for evaluation of abso-
lutely restricted shares received on an exchange of property have induced
the Supreme Court in the Tex-Penn case to abandon any attempt to value
such shares for income tax purposes, at least where the corporation is a
frankly speculative enterprise. On the question of the limits to which
the policy will be carried in cases where the speculative factor is not an
element, there is little harmony in the decisions. A further pronounce-
ment of the Supreme Court will be required before there can be any cer-
tainty as to the status of the law on this point.
